Introduction
In an interactive scenario (a "game"), an agent's payoff is determined by the actions of self and others. With interaction, the opportunity to cooperate arises, even in the midst of conflict;
conflict, on the other hand, can hinder cooperation. The understanding of cooperation and conflict sheds light on many real-world situations, such as the assessment of organizational structures, the design of environmental policies, and defining terms in bilateral trade negotiations. It is important in social dilemmas and in any transaction where economic agents have to trust and fulfill trust in order for the Pareto optimal outcome to be achieved. However, different interactive scenarios do not necessarily entail the same extent of interest for players to cooperate: cooperation is likely to vary according to the elements of the game and how the game is perceived by the respective players.
The use of game-theoretic equilibrium analysis for predicting behavior in interactive scenarios is the standard approach traditionally adopted in Economics. Equilibrium analysis requires that agents make decisions determined by a rationality-driven process of strategic reasoning. 1 Experimental research has shown that the predictions based on equilibrium analysis do not always hold: human subjects indeed cooperate more or less than theoretically predicted. As reviewed in Camerer (2003) , these results can be accommodated by behavioral theories. Such theories include "bounded rationality", where agents have limits to reasoning depth or memory, and "social preferences", where agents have preferences which take into account the welfare of others.
In turn, if one desired to extend the neoclassical framework with behavioral considerations, further information on one's degree of rationality, social preferences, beliefs and even perceptions are required. The complexity of doing this, both for agents in the game and for scientists needing to model these additional dimensions, can be considerable.
1 Game theory is an analytical tool that can be used to predict or explain behavior in interactive scenarios, based on the assumption that agents seek to maximize some objective, e.g. monetary payoffs or satisfaction/utility, and consider their opponent's behavior and what is expected of them. The combination(s) of strategies where there is no incentive for any player to unilaterally deviate is known as a Nash equilibrium, which forms the solution of the game. For a comprehensive exposition, see Gibbons (1992) .
Game harmony, the behavioural concept studied in this paper, is based on the intuition that how an economic agent perceives a game is important for her to decide how to play it. On the one hand, it can act as a component with which the neoclassical analytical framework can be enriched.
On the other hand, it is a parsimonious tool that potentially possesses predictive power even without recourse to further information on one's degree of rationality, social preferences, beliefs and even perceptions (as discussed below). Game harmony is related to group processes, framing effects and situational factors (e.g. group salience and formation), as discussed in Tan and Zizzo (2008) . Game harmony can also be founded on psychological insights. For example, experimental research (Zizzo and Tan, 2007) shows that cooperation rates are closely correlated with how harmonious a subject perceives a game to be. Perceived harmony was elicited using a technique inspired by the psychological paradigm of similarity-based reasoning: subjects rated the similarity between each game and either a very competitive or a very cooperative benchmark game. This methodology is well-known in cognitive psychology (e.g., Hahn and Chater's, 1997, review) . In Economics, Buschena and Zilberman (1999) asked subjects to evaluate the similarity between standard binary lottery choices. Gilboa and Schmeidler's (2001) case-based decision theory is a possible formalization of reasoning by similarity. An alternative way in which game harmony may explain cooperation or conflict is because of its potential link with team reasoning (Bacharach et al., 2006; Colman et al., 2008) : a more harmonious game may make subjects more likely to reason in terms of what is good for the team rather than the individual. Game harmony departs from the traditional approach in that it is a non equilibrium behavioral approach.
This paper presents an experimental test of the relationship between game harmony and cooperation in static games, where players move simultaneously and the game is played only once.
It focuses on whether we can predict cooperation rates by using basic game harmony measures (computed on the basis of raw payoffs), as opposed to the perceived harmony measures mentioned above. Game harmony is a generic game property that describes how harmonious (non-conflictual) or disharmonious (conflictual) the interests of players are, as embodied in the payoffs. To demonstrate the intuition of the concept of game harmony, consider the coordination game, constant-sum game and Prisoner's Dilemma of Table 1 .
(Insert Table 1 about here).
In the coordination game there is perfect harmony of interests between the players: the only problem is one, indeed, of coordination. In the constant-sum game, the gain of a player is the loss of another, which means that there is perfect disharmony of interests. Most games, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, do not fall in either of these two extremes: rather, they are somewhere in the middle, in terms of harmony of interests, between coordination games and constant-sum games.
Following from this intuition, it is useful to identify common properties of games that are easy to estimate and to use as predictors of how much cooperation one should expect. Such a univocally defined measure allows us to systematically label, along the same dimension, different games.
Game harmony offers one way of doing so.
Game harmony measures, being intuitively straightforward numerical indices, capture this "somewhere in the middle" more precisely. Zizzo's (2003b) most basic measure is an average of Pearson correlation coefficients among payoff pairs: in the cases of 2 ! 2 and 3 ! 3 two-player games, it reduces to the simple Pearson correlation coefficient between the payoffs of the players for each state of the world. Another measure replaces Pearson with Spearman correlations, and so a cardinal with an ordinal measure of game harmony. The ordinal measure is less sensitive than the cardinal one to the particular payoff values being chosen, and might therefore be more appealing when one seeks to compare game harmony between different game structures; for robustness, we consider both measures. In two-player games, both measures are bounded between -1 and +1, with +1 the value for coordination games and -1 the value for constant-sum games: higher numerical values indicate greater game harmony.
Our paper focuses on two-player static games. We first consider experimental evidence on a variety of well known 2 ! 2 games (e.g. the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Stag-Hunt, a coordination game and three trust games). Next, we extend our test to two further sets of data, so as to ascertain the robustness and generalizability of game harmony. The two datasets involved randomly generated generic games, one on 2 ! 2 games and the other on 3 ! 3 games. We compute game harmony values relying only on monetary payoffs. We argue that our simple game harmony measures can be used as effective predictors of cooperation in 2 ! 2 and 3 ! 3 static games: the greater the harmony of a game, the more the cooperation we should expect in a game. We find that game harmony can explain between 57% and 93% of the variance in cooperation rate in a sample of well-known games, and between 31% and 45% in a sample of 2 ! 2 randomly generated games and 21% to 40% in a sample of 3 ! 3 randomly generated games. These results are interesting, as they rely on minimal informational requirements on the part of the observer: all that we need to know is the monetary payoffs in order to have, at least, a benchmark cooperation rate. This, in turn, helps to explain why we should bother about simple predictors for cooperation: they are useful exactly because they are simple. That is, without having to know about the distributions of cognitive abilities, beliefs, other-regarding preferences and social norms in the population, given a game we may able to have a benchmark estimate of what cooperation level to expect. Achieving parsimonious predictive power of behavior should be a target which we, as economists, should be aiming for.
We are not aware of other attempts in measuring game harmony as a numerical index in a general setting. Our correlation-based measures of game harmony are closest to the "index of correspondence" (IC) informally presented for 2 ! 2 games by two social psychologists, Kelley and Thibaut (1978) ; IC has been rather neglected by economists. However, their measure is more complex than the basic measures of game harmony reviewed in this paper, and is applicable only for two-player games. Furthermore, IC is not a pure measure of game harmony as it confounds harmony with scope for cooperation, i.e. with the amount that players stand to gain from cooperating. We show that at least in our game samples IC does not gain explanatory power by doing so. Rapaport and Chammah (1965) devised specific cooperation indices in relation to 2 ! 2 Prisoner's Dilemmas. Their measures are very ad hoc and can only be applied to this narrow, if important, class of games. Zizzo (2003b) shows that their most successful measure appears to work as a proxy, in this specific setting, for our general measure of cardinal game harmony; such a measure can explain some 80% of the variance in cooperation rates in the Rapaport and Chammah's dataset. Furthermore, our data also shows the predictive success of basic game harmony measures in a sample of mostly randomly generated 3 ! 3 games.
Although it is trivial to show that game harmony is not the only thing that matters for cooperation (and we do so in section 5), we nevertheless posit that it plays a significant predictive role. In section 2 we review some relevant results of Zizzo (2003b) and present our experimental hypothesis. Sections 3 and 4 describe the experimental design and results, respectively. Section 5 contains the discussion and conclusions. The experimental instructions are in the appendix.
Theoretical Background and Experimental Hypotheses
Following Zizzo (2003b) , let " be a finite N-person game in normal form, and let N be the set of players such that |n| =N. Zizzo, 2003b) , one can then define the cardinal harmony G(") of game " as the arithmetic mean of the Pearson correlations between the C pairs of ":
(1)
In the cases of 2 ! 2 and 3 ! 3 games, both two-player games,
which is obviously bounded between -1 and +1. We shall mention three of the properties that can be
for any finite k i > 0 and h i . G(") is also invariant to transformations of " into a game $ that is the aggregation of any number of replicas of ", so G(") = G($). Further, an equivalence result can be shown to hold between perception of a game as more or less harmonious and (psychological or otherwise) payoff transformation. In a non-psychological interpretation, the payoff transformation could simply be a way of comparing game harmony and cooperation rates in any two given payoff matrices where, at least at a first approximation, such a relationship between payoffs were to hold.
Let the payoff transformation for player i in relation to the other players indexed by j % i be defined by the function:
where
] is the weight on j's utility component. Denote " u the untransformed payoff matrix and " v the payoff matrix transformed according to V.
PROPOSITION (Equivalence Result). Assume that the material payoffs a cw and b cw are given and that G(" v ) and G(" u ) are defined. Then, and, if
The proof of this result is in Zizzo (2003b) . The greater game harmony associated to a positive payoff transformation will imply greater cooperation in all games where such simple payoff transformation will help to attain it (such as in the Prisoner's Dilemma). We do not believe, however, that this is the only way in which a relationship between cooperation and game harmony can be established. For example, our definition of cooperative outcome incorporates the Nash bargaining notion that it must lead to the highest product of payoffs (see section 4.1), and this in turn is closely connected to Harsanyi and Selten's (1988) 
In the cases of 2 ! 2 and 3 ! 3 two-player games, this reduces to G & (") = r c ( ). Both G(") and G & (") implicitly assign equal weight to all states of the world. A more general class of game harmony measures in Zizzo (2003b) relaxes this assumption: in order for these more general measures to have any bite, however, one would need to specify how the different weights are determined. A natural way of doing this would be to assume that, if a subject follows an algorithm L (e.g., Nash) in solving ", a weight of 0 should be assigned to the L-dominated outcomes, and game harmony should be defined only over the L-undominated outcomes. While this may have some normative appeal, it also leads to a "uniqueness paradox": if L has a unique solution, then there is only one L-undominated outcome, and so game harmony cannot be computed, since no correlation coefficients among payoffs can be computed on the basis of just one observation. This is paradoxical, as it means that, the more successful L is in pinpointing a unique solution, the less the range of games over which L-weighted game harmony can be computed. This makes L-weighted game harmony unusable in our context, since many well-known 2 ! 2 games have unique solutions with algorithms such as L1 or L2 2 or Nash, and even a weak algorithm such as rationalizability would imply the non-computability of game harmony in the Prisoner's Dilemma.
Let there be only two players, 1 and 2, and let ' 1 and ' 2 be the respective standard deviations of their payoffs. One can then define Kelley and Thibaut's IC measure as: (4) a measure applicable only for two-player games. In their general applicability and lack of degrees of freedom, we believe that G(") and G & (") have the virtues of simplicity and parsimony. It will be on them that we shall focus in the rest of our paper to make a case for game harmony as a predictor of cooperation in static two-player games. Nevertheless, we shall also analyze whether the extra term in (4) provides any additional explanatory power to IC in our samples relative to G(").
We make the parsimonious assumption that there is a strong link between perceived harmony and harmony value as can be estimated from the game matrix: if so, one can estimate G(#) and G $ (#) from the material payoff matrix, treating the material payoffs as the utility values x iw , and use G(#) and G $ (#) as predictors of cooperation in #. Our experimental hypothesis can then be formulated as follows: whenever a unique cooperative action is defined in #, the mean cooperation rate (i.e., the mean probability of choosing this action) is increasing in G(#) and G $ (#).
Obviously, this is a strong assumption, but it is one that is convenient to make as a strong and parsimonious test of the practical relevance of our measures of game harmony. Of course subjects may perceive the game as being more or less harmonious than what its material payoff structure entails, depending on situational factors such as the way the instructions are phrased or a history of play of similar games, and more individual-specific factors such as the player's personality. To check for history dependence, in Experiments A and C we varied the game harmony of the games assigned in the practice stage. In addition, Zizzo and Tan (2007) and Zizzo (2003a) present the results of the last stage of Experiment A and C, respectively, where subjects were asked to judge the similarity of a given game to either a pure coordination (perfectly harmonious) or constant-sum (perfectly disharmonious) game. This was an attempt to try to gather extra information on how agents perceived the harmony of the game, and is discussed there.
The Experimental Design

Experiment A
Fifteen experimental sessions were run in Oxford in the March of 2002. Each session had four subjects, for a total of an overall 60 subjects. They were separated by partitions preventing them from seeing each other. The experiment was divided in three stages (plus the payment stage), all of which involved 2 ! 2 games. The games were never exactly symmetric, though they were sometimes approximately so (as will be explained below), so one could play each game in one of two roles. It may be tempting to label these roles as that of "row player" and that of "column player", but subjects always had game matrices displayed on the screen in such a way that they would be row players: this was achieved by suitably transposing game matrices as needed. We thus find more appropriate to define the role according to whether, in any given round, subjects saw the "direct" (standard) or "transposed" presentation of the game on the computer display, and label their roles as that of d-players and t-players, respectively. All game payoffs were provided as numbers between 0 and 100.
In the experimental instructions games were labeled as "decision tables", players as "participants" and coplayers as "coparticipants". In order to check understanding of the instructions, subjects filled questionnaires at the start of each stage. Their answers were checked by experimenters, and, if any was incorrect or missing, the relevant points were explained individually.
Instructions and questionnaires were on paper, but the experiment was otherwise computerized.
Stage 1. In the first stage ("Practice Stage"), subjects did practice by playing six 2 ! 2 games twice, namely once as d-players and once as t-players. They were matched with a single co-player throughout the stage, played games in random order and received feedback about the outcome of each round. Practice Stage points did not count towards final winnings. Games had been chosen according to the following procedure: 1) payoff values were generated randomly, by drawing payoff values from a uniform distribution between 0 and 100; 2) games without a unique pure Nash equilibrium were discarded; 3) according to the experimental condition, games with high, medium or low game harmony were selected (High, Medium and Low condition, respectively). Games with a unique pure Nash equilibrium were chosen because we wanted games to be, at least roughly, of the same strategic complexity notwithstanding differences in game harmony. Furthermore, in order to ensure that any distortion in behavior in the later stages were not due to a particular Table 2 .
(Insert Table 2 about here).
Most Table 2 Small payoff perturbations have been used before in experiments with 2 ! 2 games (e.g.
Rankin et al., 2000)
. They were used in our experiment for two reasons: 1) we wanted to reduce the likelihood that subjects would realize that they were playing each game in both roles; 2) we wanted games in Stage 2 not to appear "different" from Stage 1 games because of the symmetric nature of some of them and the higher frequency of the same numbers being used as payoff values. Payoff perturbation explains why games were never exactly symmetric, although four out of ten (PD, StH, ChK, CDG) were basically so (i.e., were symmetrical up to the payoff perturbation).
Stage 3, on similarity evaluations, followed, and is described in Zizzo and Tan (2007) . In playing Stage 2, subjects knew that Stage 3 exclusively involved individual choice tasks, i.e. no interactions among the players. At the end of the experiment subjects were paid the action payment (up to U.K. £ 6), the payment from Stage 3 (up to £ 12), plus £ 4 for participation. Average payments were about £ 10 for around one hour of work.
Experiment B
Experiment B was run in Oxford in November 2002 in five sessions of four subjects each, for a total of twenty subjects. It consisted of two stages only, Stage 1 and Stage 2: there was no "similarity evaluations" stage. Stage 1 was for practice and was identical to the Medium condition of Experiment A (but different sets of randomly generated games were used). In Stage 2, subjects had to play thirty randomly generated games twice, once as d-players and once as t-players, for a total of sixty rounds. The games are reproduced in Table 3 , and were again presented to the subjects in random order. Payoffs were drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 100 in all cases, and the only filtering rule in choosing the games was that we required the Nash bargaining solution action (i.e, the action associated to the outcome with the highest product of payoffs) to coincide with the utilitarian action (i.e., the action associated to the outcome with the highest sum of payoffs). We did not compute game harmony values of the random games ahead of running the experiment.
(Insert Table 3 about here.)
Each experimental point was worth £ 0.08 at the end of the experiment. 4 Mean payments were about 8.5 pounds for around 45-50 minutes of work.
Experiment C
Experiment C was run in Oxford in May 2002 in twelve sessions of four subjects each, for a total of 48 subjects. Like Experiment A, it consisted of three stages. Stage 1 was for practice and involved (between-subjects) Low, Medium, or High conditions just as Experiment A did. The crucial difference is that subjects now played six randomly generated games (like in Experiment B), and instead of 2 ! 2 games they now played 3 ! 3 games, i.e. with three actions per player. Games were chosen drawing payoff values randomly from a uniform distribution between 0 and 100, under the restriction that they all had to have a unique pure Nash equilibrium; this was to guarantee that games would be of not too widely different strategic complexity. 5 The corresponding mean G(") was -0.890, 0.159 and 0.902 in the Low, Medium and High condition, respectively: Table 4 lists the games used.
(Insert Table 4 about here.)
In Stage 2, subjects had to play ten different randomly generated 3 ! 3 games -with the exception of two 3 ! 3 variants of the PD -in sequence. The games are shown in Table 4 . Payoffs were drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 100 in all cases.
6
In Stage 3, subjects performed similarity evaluation tasks on 3 ! 3 games, an issue that our paper does not focus on, and is described and studied in Zizzo (2003a) . Each experimental point was worth £ 0.05 at the end of the experiment. 7 Mean payments were about 8.5 pounds for around 45-75 minutes of work.
Experimental Results
Definition of cooperative action
In order to determine whether game harmony was associated with a higher likelihood of play of the cooperative action, we need to define what the cooperative action is for each game in Stage 2.
In Experiment A, in the light of the easy interpretability and often well-known features of the games at hand, this should not be too controversial: unique cooperative actions, when defined, are illustrated in bold in Figure 1 . No cooperative action is defined in the constant-sum game, nor (ignoring the payoff perturbation) is there a clear one for the t-player in the EG and AG (although payoff perturbation implies a strictly dominant solution in both cases). For the d-player, the altruistic action in the AG and the non-envious action in the EG are considered as the cooperative 5 We also checked that the game samples were not otherwise meaningfully different in other undesired respects (e.g., in the distribution of mean payoff values or in that of equilibria according to non-Nash algorithms). 6 We again checked that the game samples were not otherwise meaningfully different in other undesired respects. 7 The marginal rate was slightly lower than in Experiment A to adjust average payments per unit time for the shorter length of the experiment, which contained fewer rounds in total.
actions; in the case of the AG, this can be justified, for example, on the basis of either a utilitarian social welfare function or the Nash bargaining solution. For the trust games, the (trust, fulfillment) pair is always identified as the cooperative outcome. In the coordination game the payoff (and Pareto) dominant solution is taken as the cooperative outcome. The cooperative actions are obvious in the remaining cases. Overall, a cooperative action is defined for 960 Stage 2 observations. This game-by-game-procedure to determine cooperative outcomes might be criticized for not being systematic enough. In the light of this, we devised an alternative, rule-based procedure to determine whether an outcome can be considered uncontroversially cooperative: we treated an action as cooperative if, over the (non-payoff-perturbed) game matrix, (a) it corresponds to both the utilitarian solution (it has the highest sum of payoffs) and the Nash Bargaining solution (it has the highest product of payoffs);
(b) it does not correspond to a strictly dominant strategy.
Criterion (a) ties our notion to Harsanyi and Selten's (1988) risk dominance, although it is at the same time more restrictive (because of the utilitarian solution requirement) and less restrictive (because we are not restricting ourselves to best-reply outcomes). Criterion (b) follows the intuition that, if an action is strictly dominant, then it is best for a player to play that action irrespectively of what the other player does, and therefore it may not make much sense to talk in this case of "cooperation", interpreted as "operating with", working together with, the other player towards a common goal.
There are only three differences in practice between the two procedures. The game-by-game procedure defines a cooperative outcome for the d-player in the EG and the NTG, but, as this action corresponds to the strictly dominant strategy, it is ruled out by the rule-based procedure. The rulebased procedure is also undefined in relation to the t-player in the Chicken game, as the actions associated to the Nash Bargaining and utilitarian outcomes are different in the two cases. We shall refer to cooperation as determined by the game-by-game procedure and rule-based procedure as gcooperation and r-cooperation, respectively.
A rule-based approach is particularly helpful in Experiment B, where, because of the random nature of the games, it is necessary to have a clear-cut and well-defined criterion for defining an action as cooperative. The use of the narrow solution defined above is, however, inconvenient in our sample of just ten 3 ! 3 games for two reasons. First, in 2 ! 2 games strictly dominant strategies are likely to be obvious to most players, since they require at most just one level of iteration in the deletion of strictly dominated strategies; conversely, with respect to 3 ! 3 games agents may need two levels of iterative reasoning; this leads us to consider two narrow indices, one defined as a function of just one level of iteration of deletion of strictly dominated strategies (N1) and the other defined as a function of any strictly dominant strategies (N2). Since our experiment did not measure levels of reasoning, it is unclear which one we should prefer. Second, N1 (N2) is defined only in seven (eight) games out of the ten 3 ! 3 games. This creates a serious problem of statistical power.
(As a way of comparison, the narrow solution is defined over as many as 19 2 ! 2 randomly generated games of Experiment B). For 3 ! 3 games, we shall therefore consider the definition of a cooperative action as the action associated to the utilitarian solution, i.e. the combination of actions yielding the highest sum of payoffs. Following this, and with the above qualifications in mind, we can check the robustness of these results to the use of N1 and N2 in place of the utilitarian solution as algorithm to define cooperative actions.
Results
Cooperation by game
Support for the predictive power of game harmony should come in the form of a positive correlation between G(") or G & (") and cooperation rates. In Experiment A mean g-cooperation (rcooperation) rates were 0.469 (0.389), 0.531 (0.458) and 0.509 (0.454) in the Low, Medium and High condition, respectively. In Experiment B, mean g-cooperation (r-cooperation) were 0.420 (0.414). In Experiment C, the mean cooperation rates were 0.363, 0.406 and 0.433 in the Low, Medium and High condition, respectively. Table 5 about here). Table 6 provides information on the correlation coefficients between game harmony values (or IC valueswhich apply only to 2 ! 2 games, i.e. for Experiments A and B) and mean g-cooperation in
(Insert
Experiment A, r-cooperation rates in Experiments A and B, and cooperation rates in Experiment C.
Cooperation rates are defined not only by game but also by game role (i.e., by whether an agent is d-player or t-player for any given game matrix). It is interesting to analyze cooperation rates by role for two reasons. First, basic (i.e., unweighted) game harmony measures (or the IC) cannot explain differences in cooperation rates between different roles in asymmetric games: by grouping cooperation rates by game and so averaging out cooperation rates in different roles in the asymmetric games, we are ignoring this source of unexplained variation. Second, in particular cases (such as for the AG), cooperation rates are computed from half of the observations that we have for the other games of Figure 1 , since they are computed on the basis of d-players' choices only (the only ones for which, as we explained above, we can define a cooperative choice for these games).
This is not taken into account in the correlation analysis by game.
(Insert Figures 1-3 
about here).
The main finding from Table 6 is one of a strong and always statistically significant positive correlation between game harmony, both in its cardinal and its ordinal measure, and mean cooperation rate by game c " and by role c r : the correlation coefficients involving G(#) and G $ (#) range between 0.456 and 0.962 (with P < 0.05 or better). The figures illustrate this correlation in relation to G(#). Our basic game harmony measures can explain between 57% and 93% of the variance in mean cooperation rates in Experiment A. They can explain between 31% and 45% of the variance in mean cooperation rate in Experiment B, depending on the specific game harmony and the correlation measures used. This correlation is illustrated in Figure 3 , where game 4 is the noteworthy outlier.
In Experiment C, the correlation between G(") 
Cooperation by role
A more detailed analysis would recognize that, due to the asymmetric nature of all the games (with the exception of the PD variants), we should really analyze the cooperation rate by player role, rather than just by game. This is bound to decrease the correlation coefficient, since this within-game cooperation rate variance cannot be explained by a measure that applies at the level of the game rather than at that of the single player. 9 In Experiment C, the correlation coefficients drop by about 0.1-0.15, which is comparable to the equivalent analysis for one of the 2 ! 2 games of 
Other results
Other findings also emerge. G(#) performs better than, or at least as well as, G $ (#) in Experiment B; it also performs better than, or at least as well as, IC. In Experiment A, the correlation coefficients between IC and mean cooperation rates appear roughly the same as those involving G(#) and G $ (#). There is no evidence suggesting that using a more complex concept than game harmony, such as IC, adds any predictive power on our datasets.
Of course, there are outliers. For example, as shown by Figure 1 , in Experiment A the main outliers for the (g-cooperation, G(#)) pair are KTG and UTG: while these games are only just slightly more disharmonious than the Chicken game, subjects are only about half as likely to cooperate in them. In moving from g-cooperation to r-cooperation, in Experiment A the goodnessof-fit deteriorates because (a) the EG observation has a good fit in the g-cooperation dataset and (b) the NTG observation, if reflecting only the choices of the t-player as for the r-cooperation dataset, becomes an outlier. In relation to Experiment B, five games present regression residuals higher than 0.3. Games 2, 10 and 24 are negative outliers. In games 2 and 24 the action that is associated with limited depth of reasoning 10 and with strict dominance, does not coincide with the cooperative solution for both players. In game 10, again limited depth of reasoning leads to a solution different from the cooperative solution (in addition, for the t-player the non-cooperative solution presents less risk). Games 3 and 6 are positive outliers. In both cases, the limited depth of reasoning solution is the same as the cooperative solutions.
Cases such as those of games 3 and 6 in Experiment B suggest that some subjects may have played the "cooperative" action without any intention to co-operate, and so point to the difficulty of defining cooperation unambiguously when one deals with not well-known games. But, more generally, the anomalies are only such if we were to believe what cannot be believed, namely that game harmony is the only thing that matters in determining cooperation. As our discussion of outliers suggested, and an example in the next section also will drive home, there are strategic features of games that are not fully by the game harmony values.
It is striking to find that the cooperation rates in the PD variants were below 10% in Experiment C, definitely below those found in psychological experiments (e.g., Pruitt and Kimmel, 1977) . Since the game is a 3 ! 3 variant of the PD, it is possible for the agent to cooperate partially, and this is not captured by c " . This might bias downwards an eventual finding of correlation between cooperation rate and game harmony measures.
Discussion and Conclusions
Simple game harmony measures can be used to predict the occurrence of cooperation across a range of well-known and randomly generated games. Knowledge of the material payoff matrix is all that is required to compute these measures. We presented the results from three experiments, one where subjects played mostly well-known 2 ! 2 games (Experiment A), one where subjects played randomly generated 2 ! 2 games (Experiment B), and one where subjects played randomly generated 3 ! 3 games (Experiment B). Even when due attention is given to the meaningful asymmetry of roles in some of these games, we find Pearson and Spearman correlations above 0.8 between our measures of game harmony and mean cooperation rates in Experiment A, above 0.55 in Experiment B, and above 0.46 in Experiment C.
Obviously, it would be naïve to think that game harmony is the only thing that matters for cooperation, for at least two reasons. First, it does not take into account how much is at stake in cooperating when everything else is proportionately the same (e.g., Bacharach, 2006) . This is what is implicitly taken into account by Kelley and Thibaut's (1978) "index of correspondence", though in our datasets we find that it has no additional explanatory power. Second, two games can have the same G(#) and G $ (#) and yet be likely to lead to different cooperation rates, because of differences in the strategic structure of the game. Table 7 contains a pair of games exemplifying this limitation.
(Insert Table 6 about here).
Our results however point to the conclusion that simple game harmony measures can be useful tools in assessing cooperation rates in static games, including well-known and important formulations of social dilemmas and games where coordination is an issue. These predictions can be used as benchmarks against which the role of other psychological and strategic mechanisms can be identified. All that is needed to use these measures are the payoff values; a calibration of otherregarding preferences, beliefs, norms, cognitive beliefs, or other potentially difficult-to-measure variables, is not required. We believe that there is merit in parsimonious predictive power. 
Notes:
Games are defined row-by-row: to obtain the payoff matrix corresponding to a given round and condition, replace the A, B, C, D… values in the generic payoff matrix with the corresponding value on the row for that round and condition. Stage 2 t-players saw the game matrices in their transposed form. Notes: only games where a cooperative action is defined for at least one player are included. G(") and G & (") are our cardinal and ordinal game harmony measures, respectively; IC is Kelley and Thibaut's (1978) "index of correspondence" measure. c " is the mean cooperation rate by game. Whenever defined, the "direct game" c r is the mean cooperation rate of the row players facing the game matrices as presented in Table 2 ; the "transposed game" c r is the mean cooperation rate of the row players facing the transpose of the game matrices as presented in Table 2 . In relation to Experiment A, values in […] brackets refer to g-cooperation rates only, and values in {…} brackets refer to r-cooperation rates only; g-cooperation and r-cooperation rates coincide otherwise.
TABLE 6 -CORRELATIONS BETWEEN GAME HARMONY AND IC VALUES AND COOPERATION RATES * Significant at the 5-percent level. ** Significant at the 1-percent level. *** Significant at the 0.1-percent level.
TABLE 7 -PAIRS OF GAMES WHERE GAME HARMONY DOES NOT WORK
Notes: the game to the right is obtained by swapping the second row of the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). The two games have identical G(") and G & (") values, but in the game to the right there is no strictly dominant strategy or pure Nash equilibrium, suggesting that higher cooperative (Top, Left) play may be expected.
